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. Comme11litlg ou why it has taken lhe United States sq long to apply "the 
privilege against se/f-iucrimiualion and tire right lo counsel to the proceedings fo 
the stalionho11se as well as lo those ifi the courlroom"-as the Supreme Court 
did iii Miranda v. Arizona- t/iis author notes that, "To a large exte11t this is so 
because here, as elsewhere, there has been a wide gap between the prhici/J/cs lo 
which.we aspire a11d the practices we actually employ." 
The Citizen on Trial: 
The New Confession Rules 
BY YALE KAMISAR 
l'ro/cssor of Law, U11ivcrsity of Micliiga11 
F OR Tm~ professional and amateur stu-dents !'f criminal justice in the United States June 13, 1966, was 
D-Day. On that occasion, the Supreme 
Court handed down its Jong-awaited decision 
in the landmark confession case of Mira11da 
v. Arizona, 1 finally applying the privilege 
against selr-incriminalion and the right to 
counsel to the proceedings in the stationhouse 
as well as to those in the courtroom. " The 
traditional and often elusive "voluntariness" 
test for the admissibility of confessions was 
displaced by a set of relatively specific, 
"automatic" guidelines. Thereaftor, for any 
resulting confession to be used in a criminal 
prosecution, police interrogators were re-
quired to issue a four-fold waming to persons 
in custody, advising them that: 1) they had 
a right to remain silent, 2) anything they 
did say could be used against them, 3) they 
had a right to have an attorney present during 
the questioning, and 4) if they could not 
afford a lawyer one would be provided free. 
1384 U.S. 436 ( 1966). For excerpts from this 
decision, see Current Hi1lory, June, 1967, p. 359. 
t Sec this author's "On the Tactics or Police· 
Prosecution Oriented Critics or the Courts," Cor· 
nell Law Quarterly, Vol. 49 ~1964), p. 436; and 
"When the Cops Were Not Handcuffed,' " The 
New York Times Mllgazine, November 7, 1965, p. 
34. 
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In what may prove lo be an extremely 
important part of the opinion, the High Com·t 
warned Jaw enforcement officials that if they 
continue to question a person without the 
p1·esence of an attorney and a statement is 
taken, a "heavy burden" resls on them to 
demonst..ale that the defendant knowingly 
nnd intelligently waived his rights; regardless 
of the police version of how they elicited the 
incriminating statement, "lengthy interroga-
tion" or "incommunicado incarceration" be-
fore a statement is obtained is "strong evi-
dence" that the defendant did not waive his 
rights. 
Mira11da soon became one 0£ the most pub-
licized and debated cases of our time. 
Handed down when we were experiencing a 
"crime crisis"2-a crisis to which, many sus-
t>cctcd, the Supreme Court had contributed 
heavily-the new confession ruling evoked 
much angu and spread much sorrow among 
bench and bat· and the general public, to say 
nothing of the already harassed and embit-
tered police, a goodly number of whom once 
again announced they "might as well close 
up shop." 
One week later, and almost unnoticed in 
the·hue and cry, the Supreme Court decided 
another case, one which has not received 
anything like the attention it deserves: Davis 
v. North Garoli11a.8 Since Davis was attack-
ing a 1959 murder conviction by seeking a 
writ of habeas corpus and since the new con-
fession standards were not to be given "retro-
active" effect (the Supreme Court had made 
it clear that the new test would not be ap-
plied to cases whose trials had commenced 
before the new rules had been promulgated), 
the admissibility of Davis' confessions was 
governed by the traditional "voluntariness" 
test. Thus, the appropriate inquiry was 
not whether Davis had been adequately ad-
vised of his rights before confession but 
rather whether (taking into account the 
"totality of the circumstances") his confes-
sions had been made "freely" and "volun-
tarily" or had been the product of an "over-
borne will." 
DAVIS V. NORTH CAROLINA 
That the Davis case has been largely over-
looked is regrettable, for the history of the 
case dramatically shows the ineffectiveness 
and unworkability of the traditional "volun-
tariness" test-whose passing from the scene 
four members of the High Court and many 
lawyers and laymen continue to lament. 
As to the particulars of the case, Davis had 
a third or fourth grade education and a level 
of intelligence so low that it prompted one of 
the lower courts, even while affirming his con-
viction, to raise the moral question whether 
a person of his mentality should ever be exe-
cuted, His first contact with the police oc-
curred as a small child when his mother mur-
dered his father and his long cl'iminal record 
began with a prison sentence at the age of 
15. A used-up, impoverished Negro, charged 
with the rape-murder of a white woman while 
a fugitive from a state prison camp, Davis' 
predicament was as unenviable as his sorry 
background. Having lost most of life's 
battles, he figured to lose life itself. 
Nevertheless, Davis was more fortunate 
than most alleged victims of impermissible 
police interrogation tactics. At least he 
could point to a specific notation on the arrest 
sheet which read : "Do not allow anyone to 
a 384 U.S. 505 (1966), 
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see Davis. Or allow him to use the tele-
phone." Rarely, if ever, do police officials 
make a written declaration, as they did in 
this case, of a design to hold a suspect in-
communicado. Moreover, Davis could also 
point to the uncontested fact that no one 
other than the police had seen or spoken to 
him during the sixteen days of detention 
and interrogation in an "overnight jail" which 
preceded his confessions. 
Helpful though these "objective facts" 
were, however, they did not suffice to in-
validate the confessions in the trial and 
appellate courts of North Carolina in the 
years 1959 and 1960. Nor did these facts, 
a year later, impress the federal district 
judge, who first denied Davis a hearing on 
his "coerced confession" claim, and then, 
when reversed on this point and forced to 
conduct a hearing on the issue, found Davis' 
confessions to have been "voluntary." Nor, 
in the year 1964, were these facts quite 
.. enough for the United States Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, which upheld denial of 
habeas corpus, albeit by a 3-2 vote. · 
The readiness with which the state and 
lower federal courts accepted dubious police 
claims, and the looseness with which they 
stated (or, more accurately, failed to state) 
"the facts," is hardly calculated to inspire 
confidence in the workability and cff eetive-
ness of the test-at least from the defendant's 
point of view. In affi1ming Davis' convic-
tion, a unanimous Supreme Court of North 
Carolina observed: 
[T]he prisoner was advised he need not make a 
statement; that if he did it might be used against 
him. , . , The prisoner asked to .see his sister, 
whom the officers searched for, after· some ·diffi-
culty found, and delivered the prisoner's mes-. 
sage. She appeared at the jail and Captain 
McCall admitted her· to a private conference 
with the prisoner. 
·As it happened, the prisoner's sister ·was 
admitted to a private conference with him, 
but not, the state court neglected to point out, 
until he had already confessed, after having 
been interrogated "forty-five minutes or an 
hour 01· maybe a little more" (according. to 
one of the officers) . each day for 1( dayii. 
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Similarly, the state court failed to note that 
there was no indication in thu record that 
the prisoner was advised of his rights until 
the sixteenth day-a/ter he had confessed 
orally but just before he had signed the writ-
ten confession. 
After holding its 1963 habeas corpus hear-
ing, the federal district court had little dif • 
ficulty concluding "from the totality of cir-
cumstances in this case that the confession 
was the product of a rational intellect and 
a free will." How did it deal with the tell-
tale notation on the police blotter directing 
that Davis be held i11com1111micado? It made 
no re/ere11ce whatever lo this incongruous 
item in its five-page opinion, four of which 
were devoted to the "historical facts." 
"The notation on the arrest record creates 
suspicions," conceded the 3-2 majority of 
th.e Fourth Circuit in its 1964· opinion: 
but such suspicions cannot overcome the positive 
evidence that the notation had no practical effect 
or influence upon what was done and that help 
rather than hindrance was offered to [Davis] in 
his one effort to contact someone outside the 
prison walls. 
This, of course, was the police version. The 
Fourth Circuit opinion pointed out else-
where that Davis' sister had testified at the 
habeas corpus hearing that "she twice went 
to see her brother in the Charlotte City Jail, 
but each time was turned away." The dis-
trict court, however, "did not believe her, 
finding, as the officers testified, that neither 
she nor anyone else was turned away." 
What, if anything, does the foregoing dis-
cussion prove? True, seven years after his 
conviction, the United States Supreme Court 
did finally invalidate the conf cssions by a 
7-2 vote (Justices Tom C. Clark and John 
Marshall Harlan dissenting), But it should 
not be forgotten that in the 30 years since 
Brown v. Mississippi,4 the first fourteenth 
amendment due-process confession case de-
cided by the highest court of the land, the 
4 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
11 See E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., Dealh and 1he 
Supreme Court (New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
World, 1961), pp. 297-98 •. 
e From an unoffiflial transcript or oral argument 
in Miranda and companion case!/ p. 91 1 on file in 
the Uriivenity of Michigan Law Library. 
Supreme Court has taken an average of 
only one state confession case every year. 
How fared the many defendants over these 
years who did not have the benefit of a power-
ful and coherent dissenting opinion? How 
fared the many defendants whose cases did 
not receive the meticulous attention each 
Supreme Court justice gives "death penalty" 
cases ma1·ked in red, as was Davis' case and 
two-thirds of the conf cssion cases the Com·t 
has chosen to review these past 30 years? 
RIGHTS AND THE COURTS 
Analyzing a recent Supreme Court term, 
E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., a Washington, 
D.C., attorney who is a careful student of the 
High Court's work, reported that the Court 
was asked to review over 2,000 cases, of 
which 42 involved the death penalty. 
Although "all of the allegations in these cap-
ital cases were so serious that the Supreme 
Court might have felt compelled to decide 
each and every one of them" only one con· 
dcmned man out of four received a hearing, 
and only one out of eight obtained a rc-
vcrsal.0 How many garden-variety criminal 
defendants who cried "coerced confession" 
but lost the "swearing contest" below could 
survive the difficult winnowing process above? 
As Justice Hugo Black put it in the Mira11da 
oral arguments, "if you arc going to determine 
it. [the admissibility of the confession] each 
time on the circumstances ... [i~ this Court 
will take them one by one , .. it is more than 
we arc capable of doing."0 
Whether or not it is more than the judges 
in the "front lines" are capable of doing, it 
seems to be more than very many of them 
were ready and willing to do. The defendant 
who was in fact beaten, threatened, tricked 
or cajoled into confessing faced such enor· 
mous, almost insurmountable, problems of 
proof that the safeguards provided by the old 
"totality of circumstances-voluntariness" test 
were largely illusory. When, as was almost 
invariably the case, the police and the de-
fendant presented sharply conflicting versions 
of what happened behind the closed doors 
and when there were no means of inde-
pendently verifying either version, trial 
judges were under heavy pressure to accept 
the police account. 
As police interrogators abandoned physical 
violence and made greater use of "psycho· 
logical" techniques over the years, the prob-
lems of proof became increasingly arduous. 
Disputes over whether physical violence oc-
curred are not always easy to resolve, but 
evidence of "mental" or "psychological" co-
ercion is especially elusive. Not infrequently, 
the defendant is quite inarticulate, which 
aggravates the difficulties of recreating the 
tenor and atmosphere of the police question-
ing, 
A short week after Justice Harlan mani-
fested a sanguine attitude about the "work-
ability" apd "eff ectivencss" of the traditional 
"voluntariness" test (in his dissenting opinion 
in Miranda) he and Justice Clark would have 
applied the old test to sustain Davis' confes-
sions. "The sporadic interrogation of Davis," 
as they saw it, 
can hardly be denominated as sustained or over-
bearing pressure. From the record it appears 
that he was simply questioned for about an hour 
each day [for sixteen days] by a couple or de· 
tectives. 
"Disagreement," said Justice Harlan of the 
"voluntariness" test in his Miranda dissent, 
"is usually confined to that borderland of 
close cases where it matters least." After 
three decades and 30-odd "coerced" confes. 
sion cases which saw the overall gauge steadily 
changing, usually in the direction of restrict-
ing police interrogation methods, was Davis 
still a "close case?" If so, was the need to 
scrap the "voluntariness" test still a close 
question? 
The question has been a~ked in many quar-
ters: If the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and the right to counsel really mean as 
much as the Supreme Court now says they 
' See the discussion and authorities collected in 
Yale Kamlsar, Fred E. Inbau and Thurman Arnold, 
Criminal Justice in Our Timi (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1965), pp. 21-25, 
31-33. 
a Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), at 59-
62. . 
e Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961)1 
at 578. 
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do, why did they mean so little all these years? 
For many decades, the "legal mind"-un-
happily displaying a "trained incapacity" (to 
use Thorstein Veblen's phrase} to see the 
problem in the round-was equal to the task 
of seeming to reconcile the grim proceedings 
in the stationhouse with the lofty principles 
in the Constitution: police interrogration-
indeed, the "third degree"-did not violate 
the Constitution because the questioning did 
not involve any kind of judicial process for 
the taking of testimony. The argument ran 
tliat, because police officers have no legal 
authority to compel statements of any kind, 
there is no legal obligation to answer to which 
the privilege against self-incl'imination can 
apply; hence, the police can elicit statements 
from suspects who are likely to assume or be 
led to believe that there are legal (or extra-
legal} sanctions for stubbornness.' 
Of course the view that police interrogation 
was neither limited nor affected by the privi-
lege ?gainst self -incrimination 01· the right to 
counsel had a great deal more to commend it 
than merely the inherent force of its 11J0gic" 
or the self -restraint and tenderness of the 
exempted class of intenogators. It must 
have had, in order for it to have been taken 
seriously for so long. 
SOCIETY'S ROLE 
Among the forces at work was one of so-
ciety's most effective analgcsics-"necessity,11 
real or apparent. Its influence may be seen 
in numerous opinions. Although Justice 
Robert H. Jackson recognized, in his much· 
quoted concurring opinion in the 1949 Watts 
case,8 that "if the State may ••• interrogate 
without counsel, there is no denying the fact 
that it largely negates the benefits of the con-
stitutional guaranty," he was willing to let 
this "negation" occur, for othenvise 
the people of this country must discipline them· 
selves to seeing their police stand by helpleisly 
while those susp~cted of murder prowl about un-
molested, 
Again, the first axiom of Justice Felix Frank· 
furter's dissertation on police interrogation 
and confessions in the 1961 Culombe case9 is: 
"Questioning suspects is indispensable in law 
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enforcement." "Questioning," as Justice 
Frankf urther and many others used the 
tenn, is a euphemistic "shorthand" for ques-
tioning without advising the suspect of his 
rights or pennitting defense counsel, friends 
or relatives to be present. 
As Justice Arthur J. Goldberg observed in 
the Escobedo case,10 the police interrogation 
practices which have prevailed in this coun-
try until very recently were based in large 
measure on 
the /ear that if an accused is permitted to consult 
with a lawyer, he will become aware of and exer-
cise, these rights. 
* * * 
If the exercise of constitutional rights will 
thwart the effectiveness of a system of law en-
forcement [Justice Goldberg commented further), 
then there is something very wrong with that 
system. 
The lack of confidence in and impatience 
with the principles we profess-when the 
chips arc really down-was noted by Justice 
Frankfurter in another context, that of "trial 
by newspaper-and TV." Dissenting from 
the Court's opinion sustaining a conviction 
for the sexual molestation-murder of a little 
girl, despite sensational pretrial press cover-
age of the event, Justice Frankfurter pro-
tested: 
Such passion as the newspapers stirred in this 
case can be explained (apart from mere commer-
cial exploitation of revolting crime) only as 
want of confidence in the orderly course of jus-
tice. To allow such use of the press by the prose-
cution as the California court [and the United 
States Supreme Court] here left undisciplined, 
implies either that the ascertainment of guilt can-
10 378 U.S. 478 {1964), at 490. 
11 Stroble v. Cahfornia, 343 U.S. 181 (1952), 
at 201-02. 
12 Office of the District Attorney of Los An-
geles County, Results of Survey Regarding the Ef • 
fects of the Dorado and Miranda Dtcisions Upon 
the Prostcution of Felony Cases (August 4, 1966), 
p. 4, copy on file in the University of Michigan 
Law Library. 
13 Thurman Arnold, The Symbols of Govern-
ment (Harbinger ed.; New York: Harcourt, Brace 
& World, 1962), p. 142. 
14 Herbert Packer, "Two Models of the Criminal 
Process," Uniu1mity of Pennsylvania Law Review, 
Vol.113 (1964),p.64. 
1n Colin Macinnes, "The Criminal Society," in 
The Police and the Public (London: William 
Heinemann Ltd., 1962), p. IOI. 
not be left to the established processes of law or 
impatience with those calmer aspects of the judi-
cial process which may not satisfy the natural, 
primitive, popular revulsion against horrible 
crime but do vindicate the sober second thoughts 
of a community.a 
It now appears that the "necessity" for in· 
terrogating suspects without advising them of 
theh· rights was considerably exaggerated. 
For example, after surveying more than 1,000 
post-Miranda cases, in fully half of which the 
defendant had made an incriminating state-
ment, Evelle Younger, Los Angeles district 
attorney, concluded: 
Large or small, ••• conscience usually or at least 
often, drives a guilty person to confess. If nn 
individual wants to confess, a warning from a 
police officer, acting as required by recent deci-
sions, is not likely to discourage him.12 
Other significant factors operating over 
many decades to freeze the status quo were 
the invisibility of the stationhouse proceedings 
-no other case comes to mind in which an 
administrative official is pennitted the same 
broad discretionary power assumed by the 
police interrogators, together with the power 
to prevent objective recorclation of the facts-
ancl the failure of influential groups to iclen-
tif y with those segments of our society which 
furnish most of the raw material for the 
criminal process. As Thmman Amold, a 
former federal judge and a former United 
States assistant attorney general, once pointed 
out, too many people are roused by any "vio-
lation of the symbol of a ceremonial trial," 
but "left unmoved by an ordinary noncere-
monial injustice."13 And as Professor Her-
bert Packer of the Stanford Law School re-
cently observed: 
One of the most powerful features of the Due 
Process Model is that it thrives on visibility. 
People are willing to be complacent about what 
goes on In the criminal process as long as they nre 
not too often or too explicitly reminded of the 
gory details. 14 
Society, one might add, does not want to be 
reminded, docs not "want to know about 
criminals, but it docs want them put away, 
and it is incurious how this can be clone pro-
vided it is clone."15 It stings now to say it, 
for we al"e too close to it; but in the first two· 
thirds of the twentieth century too many 
people, good people, viewed the typical police 
auspcct and his interrogator as garbage and 
garbage collector, respectively. (Thia is every 
bit as unfortunate for the officer as it is for 
tho suspect.) 
Moreover, with the inadvertent exception 
of those who wrote the interrogation manu· 
ab-each manual very likely equal to a dozen 
law review articles in ita Impact on the Court 
(tho majority opinion in Mira11da devotes six 
Cull pages to extracts from various police 
manuals and texts spelling out techniques for 
depriving the suspect of every psychological 
advantage, keeping him "off balance," ex-
ploiting his fear and insecurity, and tricking 
or cajoling him out of exercising his rights)-
most law enforcement agency members and 
their spokesmen did their best to keep society 
comfortable and blissfully ignorant. Not too 
aurprisingly, they were much more interested 
In "sanitizing" the proceedings in the inter-
rogation room than in diMeminating the liie-
si1.0 details. As long ago as 1910 (when, 
everybody now agrees, things were in a ter-
rible atatc), the president of the ~ntemational 
Association of Chiefs of Police aMured us: 11 
Volunteer confessions and adm!Nlons made after 
a prisoner luu been cautioned that what he 
1tate1 may be used agalnat hlm, are all there la 
to the 10-called "Third Degree." 
/u recently as July, 1966, tlte veteran spe-
cial agent of the Kansas Bureau of Investiga-
tion, Alvin A. Dewey, of Jn Cold Bloot11' 
fame, testified before the Senate subcommit-
tee on constitutional amendments: 19 
u Major Richard Sylveater'1 commenta are re-
ported In John Lnnon, "Preient Police and Legal 
Method• for tho Deterrillnatlon o( the Innocence or 
Guilt o( the Suspect!' Jo urnal of Criminal Law and 
Crimlnolon, Vol. lb (1925)1 pp. 222-25. n See Truman Capote, In Cold Blood (New 
York: Random House, 1966). 
1' Statement ot Alvin A. Dewey before the aub-
commlttee on conatltutlonal amendments of the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, July 21, 1966{ 
p. 2 (mimeographed), on file In the University o 
Mlchfian Law Library. 
1t National Commluion on Law Observance and 
Enforcement R1~ort on Lawlmnus in Law En· 
fore1m1nt (Wuhlngton1 U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1931), generally referred to 11 the Wicklr· 
Jhom R1Jorl. 
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What la wrong with an officer exercising per-
1i1tence or ah owing confidence? hn't that what 
any good 1aleaman demonstrates In 1e1Ung IDJur-
ance or a car? And a law enforcement omcer 
ahould be a good aatcsman in 1clllng a auapect on 
telling the truth, proving his Innocence or guilt. 
But a snlcsman cannot do hi1 Job if a competitor 
is standing by, and that b the 1ituatlon for the 
law enforcement officer with tho pre.cnco of an 
attorney whllc Interrogating a 1u1pect. 
• • • 
As to the dcmlptlon of an Interrogation room, 
I wl1h to define It as a room where people can 
talk In privacy which la nothing more than an 
attorney dc1lre1 In talking to his client or a doc-
tor In talking to hia patient. , , , (These rooms) 
bear no reaomblnnce to torture chambcn as some 
may wish to thlnlt, and In fnct 1omc are equipped 
with air conditioning, carpeting, and upholatered 
furniture, 
PERSISTENT ROOTS 
What I have suggested so far does not fully 
account for the persistence of the de facto in-
quisitorial system. In the late 1920'1 and 
early 1930111 complacency about the system 
Wa.1 shaken-at least for a while-by several 
notorious cases, and by the shocking disclo-
sures of the Wickersham Commission's report 
on "lawlwness 1n law enforcement."11 Still 
the system survived. Why? Probably be-
cause, in addition to tho f acto11 already men-
tioned, the practice had become so widespread 
and entrenched that even most of its critics 
despaired of completely uprooting it in the 
foreseeable future. A broad, fundamental 
attack on the system might well have failed 
completely; elimination of the more aggra-
( Conlinutd on fH!.gt 114) · 
Yale Kamisar is the author of numerous law 
journal articles on .the con1litutional dimen-
sions of criminal procedure and is coauthor 
of Criminal /uslic1 in Our Timo (Charlottes-
ville: University Press of Virginia, 1965) 
(with Fred E. Inbau and Thurman Am~ld); 
Modern Criminal Proeedum Cam, .Com-
ments and Questions (2d ed.; St. Paul: West 
Publishing Co., 1966) (with Livingston 
Hall) ; and Constitutional !Aw: Oases, 
Comments and Quesl{ons (2d ed.; St. Paul: 
West Publishing Co., 1961) (with William 
B. Lockhart and Jesse H; Cho~~). 
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( Conlinfled from page 81) 
vated lonns of coercion commanded a high 
priority and alone appeared feasible. In 
this regard, the pessimistic views, some 36 
years ago, of Harvard Law School's Zechal'iah 
Cha(ee, coauthor of the famous report to the 
Wickersham Commission on "the third de· 
gree,"20 arc instructive: 
It 11 hard enough to prevent policemen Crom 
using physical violence on suspects; it would be 
(or harder to prevent them from asking a few 
questions. We had better get rid of the rubber 
hose and twenty.four hour grillings before we 
undertake to compel or penuade the police to 
give up questioning altogether.tt 
New advances in constitutional-criminal 
procedure have rarely suffered from a short-
20 Ibid., p. 26. 
21 Zechariah Chafce, "Remedies (or the Third 
Deg~e," Thi Atlantic Monthly, November, 1931. 
pp. 621, 630. 
age of absolutely thunderstruck commenta· 
to11. Miranda is no exception. To a large 
extent this is so because here, as elsewhere, 
there has been a wide gap between the prin-
ciples to which we aspire and the practicr.s we 
actually employ. The offidally prescribed 
norms-what Professor Packer calls the Due 
Process Model-view the criminal process as 
limited by and subordinate to the maintenance 
of the dignity and autonomy of the individual. 
But the real-world criminal process, what 
Packer calls the "assembly line" Crime Con· 
trot model, sees the "efficient" disposition of 
criminal suspects as the central value to be 
served and tends to be far more administrative 
and managerial than it docs adversary and 
judicial.11 
PRIZE FOR INGENUITY 
In theory or principle, there is nothing 
really startling or inventive about the new 
confession ntllng. The prize for ingenuity, 
I think it may foirly be said, goes not to the 
Supreme Court for finally applying the privi-
lege against self-incrimination and the right 
to counsel to the police station but rather to 
those who managed to devise rationales for 
excluding these rights from the stationhouse 
all these many years." 
It may be that we cannot really do in this 
area of the Jaw what we have done with 
respect to school segregation and legislative 
malapportionment, namely take our ideals 
down from the walls where we have kept them 
framed "to be pointed at with pride on cere· 
monial occasions," and Instead "put flesh 
and blood" on them."u But this task must 
be left to Miranda's hope for a more enlight-
ened posterity. 
u Sec Packer, op. cil., pp. 1-68, and the same 
writer'• "The Courts, the Police and the Red of 
U1," Journal o/ Criminal Law, Criminology and 
Po1ic1 Sei1nt1, Vol. !17 (1966), p. 239. 
ta The point ii elabOrated In thla author'• "A 
Dissent from the Miranda Dissentsi Somo Com-
ments on the 'New' Fifth Amendment and the Old 
'Voluntariness' Testt' Michigan Law Review, Vol. 
65, (1966), pp. 64-76. 
tt The quoted la_nguage ls taken from the re· 
marks of Justice Walter Schaefer of the 1111· 
nol1 Supreme Court In "Symposium on Poverty, 
Equality and the Administration of Criminal J II!• 
tlce," K111luel;~ Law Journal, Vol. !14 ( 1966), pp. 
!121, !12+. 
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